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This paper offers a solution to King Solomon's problem of allocating an indivisible "prize" to
two agents. We add time dimension to the original space of outcomes and construct a static
mechanism similar to the one used in virtual implementation. The implementation is
imminent: the mechanism results in the original outcome, which is provided with an
arbitrarily small delay.
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One of the oldest problems of implementation theory is described in the
following Biblical story. Two women, both claiming that they are the (only)
mother of a child, are brought to King Solomon to ﬁnd out the truth and
to place the child under the true mother’s custody. King Solomon asks the
women to tell him who the mother is and warns them that if they both claim
they are, he will have no choice but to cut the baby and give a half to each
of them. Both women claim the baby. When the cutting seemed inevitable,
one of the women changed her announcement and suggested giving the baby
to the other woman, apparently in an attempt to save the baby’s life. Now,
faced with seeming agreement of the women, King Solomon deviates from
the rules he has just announced and awards the baby to the woman who is an
impostor, according to both women. The Bible explains that King Solomon
had been trying to exploit the diﬀerence in preferences of the two women:
while the true mother prefers the child to be given to another woman rather
than cut, the impostor has just the opposite preferences.
Although King Solomon did implement the result he wanted, it is clear
that he exploited not only the diﬀerence in preferences but also shortsighted-
ness of the women: if both knew that King Solomon would change the rules,
both would point to the other as the true mother. The question that could
be asked then is whether it is possible to design a mechanism that would not
rely on the bounded rationality of the agents.
Surprisingly, the answer is negative if we restrict our attention to exact
implementation and simultaneous announcements. Two directions have been
taken to avoid this negative result. The ﬁrst is the implementation by a
sequential mechanism with money and the second is by a mechanism that
uses lotteries and gives the desired outcome only approximately. Those two
approaches will be discussed in section 3.
This paper proposes a third approach: to exploit agents’ time preference
reversals. Although the mechanism proposed is one-shot, these reversals
are relevant because an outcome may be implemented with delay. Since
the implementation may be postponed in the equilibrium, the social choice
function that is actually implemented by the mechanism may be slightly
diﬀerent from the Solomonic one, but that diﬀerence can be made arbitrarily
small by reducing the delay: implementation is imminent.
The diﬀerence of imminent Nash implementation with another type of
approximate implementation, virtual, concerns the way the approximation is
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teries. An imminent Nash mechanism is required to preserve the “physical”
outcome and can only slightly change the utility associated to that outcome
by changing the time of the delivery. Thus, such a mechanism cannot take
advantage of players’ preference reversals anywhere in the space of alterna-
tives and, in that sense, provides a weaker approach.
On the other hand, the advantage of the proposed mechanisms is that
its outcome is arbitrarily close to the desired one everywhere in the mecha-
nism. Virtual implementation requires a lottery to be run; once the lottery
is realized, some highly unlikely outcome, which is far away from a socially
desirable one, may have been picked. That leads to the concern of possible
renegotiation and, if renegotiation is foreseen, of the failure of the mecha-
nism. In contrast, the imminent mechanism delays the outcome: the outcome
is never eﬃcient, but it is never far away from the desired one. Thus, the
risk of renegotiating the mechanism is far diminished.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the
problem. Section 3 discusses the existing results on Nash implementation,
implementation via sequential game and virtual implementation. Section 4
introduces the time dimension into the implementation problem. Section 5
proposes the mechanism that implements the Solomonic social choice func-
tion and section 6 concludes.
2 Formal representation of the dilemma
Players are two women, Ann (A) and Beth (B). The set of outcomes, Ω, is
{baby allocated to A (a), baby allocated to B (b), baby is cut (c)}. There
are two possible states: A is the true mother (α), B is the true mother (β).
Agents’ preferences are as follows:
a A b A c and b B c B a if state is α and
a A c A b and b B a B c if state is β
The social choice function King Solomon wishes to implement is
F : {α,β} → Ω, F(α) = a, F(β) = b.
For the mechanism of the paper, we add another outcome, d, death for
all, to the set of outcomes Ω. This is the worst outcome for both women in
every state:
∀x 6= d,x ∈ Ω and for any (α,β): x A d and x B d.
We add d to ensure that the lower contour set is not empty; that condition
2often arises in the two-person implementation problems (see, e.g., Dutta and
Sen, 1991). In turn, the outcome c, cut the baby, will not be used in the
mechanism.
3 Existing results
A major result of the Nash implementation literature, due to Maskin (1999),
provides a necessary condition for Nash implementation: the social choice
function should be Maskin monotonic.
Deﬁnition 1 A social choice function F is Maskin monotonic if ∀a ∈ F(t),
a / ∈ F(t0), there is an agent i and an outcome b such that a t
i b,b t0
i a
Clearly, the Solomonic social choice function is not monotonic and, thus,
not Nash implementable. Indeed, note that a ∈ F(α) and that the only
change that involves a when we go from the state α to the state β is that a
becomes more desirable for B.
Glazer and Ma (1989) modiﬁed the problem and proposed a solution.
The modiﬁcation is two-fold. First, they add a new commodity, money, and
allow transfers. Second, they make an assumption about the relative utilities
of the women: they assume that the true mother values a child at vh and
the other woman values a child at vl, vh > vl. For this modiﬁed problem
they propose the two-stage mechanism with sequential announcements by
women, where the payment oﬀ the equilibrium is chosen to guarantee that
the impostor does not want to claim the baby.
The assumption that both the designer and the women know the valua-
tions may look troublesome. Further research has indicated that the problem
can be avoided, although more complicated mechanisms are employed.
A mechanism that does not rely on the designer’s knowledge of exact
valuations vh and vl is proposed in the original paper by Glazer and Ma, and
another, more elegant version is presented in Moore (1992). Those papers
assume that, although the designer does not know the exact valuations, she
knows that the valuation of the true mother is higher than the valuation of
the impostor. Both women are assumed to know the exact valuations of each
other.
Perry and Reny (1999) relax this last assumption: they assume that the
women, like the designer, only know that vh > vl. They use a second price
sealed bid auction with an option to quit and show that such a mechanism
3implements the desired social choice function. Along with weakening in-
formation requirements, another advantage of this mechanism is that it is
solvable by iterated elimination of dominated strategies, a solution concept
that is weaker than subgame perfection used by Glazer and Ma and Moore.
Olszewski (2003) oﬀers a simpler mechanism, which requires two rounds of
elimination instead of four of Perry and Reny. Bag and Sabourian (2004)
generalize the mechanism to the case of several identical prizes.
However, all these papers modiﬁed the original Solomonic problem in
two ways. First and foremost, all the mechanisms discussed so far need
an additional variable to function: money. If monetary transfers are not
possible, even oﬀ-equilibrium, those mechanisms could not be used. Second,
the problem they solve, although the most relevant economically, is not the
problem King Solomon faced: the assumption that the true mother has higher
valuation does not immediately follow from the Biblical story: the impostor
may be as eager to have the baby as the true mother.
Another approach toward implementing King Solomon dilemma is to use
virtual implementation. The outcome of such a mechanism is a lottery that
gives the child to the true mother with some probability that can be made ar-
bitrarily close to one. There are a few disadvantages to the second approach.
First, there is always a non-zero probability that the mechanism results in
a socially undesirable outcome, such as cutting the baby, even when both
women report truthfully. The second observation follows immediately: it
may happen that society (or players) will not accept the outcome prescribed
by the mechanism. If such a possibility were foreseen, the mechanism would
fail.
4 Nash Implementation with an Option to
Delay
This paper oﬀers a third approach to the problem: it exploits time preferences
of the players in the context of static mechanisms. We assume that the true
mother and an impostor diﬀer in preference as to when the child is allocated
to the other woman – if they cannot secure the child for themselves. The
impostor wants the child to be given to the other woman as late as possible
(because she does not care about the baby) while the true mother prefers the
child to be allocated as soon as possible (because King Solomon’s custody
4is not good for the child). Although this speciﬁcation of time preferences
does not directly follow from the Biblical story, as the story does not tell
anything about time preferences of the women, it is probably the most natural
assumption about the women’s time preferences, given that impostor does
not seem to care about the well-being of the child in the original story.
With the time dimension added, the outcome of the mechanism is a pair-
ing of an allocation and the time when this allocation is oﬀered: Ω × T,
where Ω is the non-expanded (original) set of outcomes and T = [0,∞) is
a real non-negative number, interpreted as time at which the allocation is
delivered. Throughout the rest of the paper the object (z,t) ∈ Ω × T will
be referred to as an outcome and the object z ∈ Ω will be referred to as an
allocation. The expansion of the set of outcomes requires also the expansion
of the preferences into the new domain, Ω × T. For the particular problem
of King Solomon’s dilemma we assume that the women have the following
preferences:
under both states, α and β
(a,t) A (b,t) and (b,t) B (a,t) ∀t
(a,t) A (d,t0),(b,t) A (d,t0) and (a,t) B (d,t0), (b,t) B (d,t0) ∀t,t0
(a,t) A (a,t0) and (b,t) B (b,t0) ∀t0 > t
if the state is α
(b,t) A (b,t0) and (a,t0) B (a,t) ∀t0 > t
if the state is β
(b,t0) A (b,t) and (a,t) B (a,t0) ∀t0 > t
The description of preferences above is not complete: no comparison is
given for (a,t) vs. (b,t0). These preferences do not matter for the mechanism
presented and could be completed arbitrarily. On the other hand, if one
imposes some additional assumptions on preferences over these outcomes,
one can get rid of the outcome d by ensuring that the lower contour set is
non-empty.
The social choice function King Solomon wishes to implement on the ex-
panded domain is F : {α,β} → Ω×T, F(α) = (a,0), F(β) = (b,0). Clearly,
this extension of the set of outcomes cannot make the social choice function
Nash implementable because it is still not Maskin monotonic, as concluded
in the previous section. However, it can be implemented approximately.
Deﬁnition 2 The social choice function F : Υ → Ω × T, F(τ) = (ωτ,tτ)
is imminently Nash implementable if ∀ε there exists F ε : Υ → Ω × T,
F ε(τ) = (ωτ,t0
τ) such that ∀τ : |t0
τ − tτ| ≤ ε and F ε is Nash implementable
5In other words, in imminent Nash implementation the allocation should
remain the same and the time when the allocation is delivered may diﬀer by
no more than ε from the time prescribed by social choice function. As the
social choice function is extended from the set Ω into the set Ω×T, such SCF
would prescribe implementation at time zero. Thus, the previous statement
can be reformulated in the following way: while the allocation must stay the
same, the option to delay slightly the delivery of the allocation is given to
the designer.
5 Mechanism
Proposition 1 The Solomonic social choice function F is imminently Nash
implementable.
Proof. Let F ε, required by the deﬁnition of imminent Nash implementa-
tion, be deﬁned as F ε(α) = (a,ε), F ε(β) = (b,ε). We will need to show
that F ε is Nash implementable. The mechanism that implements this social
choice function is similar to the mechanism for virtual implementation of the
Solomonic rule, given in Serrano (2004).
The message space of the mechanism is Υ × Υ × N; that is, the woman




A} and Beth’s message by {m1
B,m2
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B}. The outcome function
g(m) of the mechanism is given by the following set of rules
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B = β, in the state β and m3
A =
m3
B = 0 in both states, is an equilibrium of this mechanism.
Indeed, suppose that the state is α. Then, by changing her announce-
ment, Ann can only change the outcome to (d,0) or to (a,2ε), both of which
6are worse than (a,ε). Beth can only induce (d,0) or (a,ε/2) and she weakly
prefers the outcome of truth telling, (a,ε) to both outcomes she can achieve.
Thus, none of them has a proﬁtable deviation if the state is α and, sym-
metrically, if the state is β and, therefore, truth telling is indeed a Nash
equilibrium.
Now we have to show that there are no other equilibria. Note that there
cannot be an equilibrium under the last rule, when both reports are inconsis-
tent: the player, to whom the child is not allocated as a result, can deviate
by announcing an integer higher than the other agent’s and, thus, obtain the
best possible outcome.
No equilibrium is possible either when only one of the reports is not
unanimous because one can obtain a higher payoﬀ by making the second
report inconsistent as well and announcing a high enough integer.
The case that remains is when all the announcements are consistent, but
not truthful. In that case we can take advantage of the preference reversal
of the women.
Suppose that the true state is α and the announcement is m
j
i = B. The
outcome of that message is (b,ε). Thus, by changing m2
A from B to A Ann can
obtain the outcome (b,ε/2),which she prefers to (b,ε), the original outcome.
Therefore, Ann has a proﬁtable deviation. The same argument applies to
the state β.
Hence, the only Nash equilibrium of the mechanism is truth-telling and
the only outcome is (a,ε) if the state is α and (b,ε) if the state is β which is
exactly F ε. QED
6 Conclusion
This paper oﬀers a solution to King Solomon’s dilemma when the designer is
allowed to delay slightly the delivery of the outcome. This delay is the source
of ineﬃciency in the mechanism, but can be made arbitrarily small. The
mechanism proposed in the paper is one-shot and is similar to the mechanism
of virtual implementation, but they diﬀer both in theoretical terms, since
another technique is used to approximate the outcomes, and in practical
terms, because time preference is more appropriate to use in King Solomon’s
problem than risk preference.
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